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DELIVERING THE GOODS:
Herein of Mead, Delegations, and Authority
Patrick McKinley Brennan1

“[V]alue not connected by mind to responsible belief is mirage,
nothing, vanishing when questioned or sought. And it is this
connection, of value and responsible mind, that is law’s
distinctive contribution, made prior to political theory and
after theory is finished speaking – atheoretical in its concern
with the legitimacy of the detail, which cannot be secured by any
tracing of power or jurisdiction to a formal source, kingly,
legislative, popular, or judicial. Against the fading of the
conditions for true deference is what comes from law that pushes
toward the personal and toward a context of decisionmaking in which the
personal can be recognized. . . . Legislators, line agencies, and
coordinating executive agencies, as well as courts, are engaged
in this work.”
--Joseph Vining, “Authority and Responsibility:
The Jurisprudence of Deference”

While there no doubt exist instructive parallels between scriptural interpretation
and legal (and specifically constitutional) interpretation, caution is in order.2 It is not
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clear which is the greater risk – sacralizing the profane or profaning the sacred. Perhaps
the greatest risk is in blurring the distinction. We need to distinguish, in order to unite.
Adherents of the so-called religions of the book – Christians, Jews, and Muslims -interpret their scriptures in order to learn what God has spoken to God’s people. In law,
by contrast, all comers interpret what others have already said in the name of the law in
order to determine how we are now to live. But this gulf, between what God has said and
what other humans have already said in the name of the law, can easily be overdrawn. If
we distinguish, we can then unite at the right points. In the Catholic tradition, on which I
shall draw here, it is understood that doing human law is part of the divine mandate to do
and pursue the good and to avoid evil; we interpret in law in order, within certain more or
less defined parameters, to give authoritative effect to the divine natural law3 in the life of
the political community. Consideration of “delegation” and “authority,” staples of our
quotidian legal discourse, will reveal something of how the divine natural law makes its
untrumpeted entrance into human law, including through unprepossessing administrative
outputs that bear the force of law.

I.
Imagine that you make spectacular widgets. Imagine further that the XYZ agency
has just published in the Federal Register what it styles there a “regulation” that might –
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or might not – render it impossible for you to continue to make your widgets while still
showing a profit. What are you to make of this administrative output?
Under the statute to which XYZ points in its statement of the basis and purpose of
the “regulation,” XYZ has been delegated power not only to “make rules and regulations”
“governing widgets;” the statute further provides that widgets are to be “safe for use by
people of all ages.” You believe that any regulation that would in fact render widgets
“safe for use by people of all ages” could regulate your business, and perhaps the entire
industry of which it is a part, out of existence. The experts whom you have consulted
agree with you about the possible economic effects of such regulation. XYZ received
public comments on its proposed “regulation” during the period it was deliberating.
Before saying any more, I should flag the danger in this sort of imagining. My
concern here is law and how it works, and we do ourselves a grave disservice if, through
analysis or reflection or thought experiment, we unwittingly dilute or obscure law’s
reality. Law is not an armchair enterprise. What we do in law shows some deep down
commitments that positivists, legal geometers, and most other jurisprudents miss or deny.
Joseph Vining is an exception, for he sees that “Law is evidence of belief far stronger
than academic statement and introspection can provide.”4
To return, then, to my question: What are you to make of this “regulation?” On
the one hand, you will want to know whether XYZ, a potential source of publicly
justified coercion, portends to act on the basis of its “regulation” to affect your business,
your fortunes, your future. Is XYX serious about this “regulation?” Will it bother to
enforce it? If so, up to what point? Against you? Should you, then, skirt it, evade it, or
even deny it, either before the agency or before a court?
4
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Important though they be, the answers to these questions do not decide everything
that is likely at issue for you. You will also want to know whether you should willingly
obey this regulation. The existential point, if you will, is that in the face of government
outputs such as this “regulation,” there are many possible responses. To be sure, some
people think that “obeying” law is just a matter of avoiding unpleasant consequences, but
such a view, common though it is, overlooks important evidence, including that we
sometimes offer willing obedience, including to law. Will a court of law, in the event
this regulation is reviewed, give it effect? If so, what effect? The courts have
acknowledged different kinds or degrees of deference.5 To these might correspond
different kinds or modes of obedience.
To return to my questions: How will you decide what to do? Will you willingly
obey, or will you merely comply with, or perhaps evade, XYZ’s “regulation?” The
choice is yours, but the worthy -- and the common if underappreciated -- course is to
determine whether this agency output bears (what in the literature is called) the force of
law. Not everything called a “regulation” or even a “law,” though produced by the
governing authority in a procedurally proper manner, calls for willing obedience. Civil
disobedience is just the extreme case.
How, you ask, will you determine whether XYZ’s regulation carries the force of
law? Agencies such as XYZ generate all manner of output, such as rules, orders, letters,
interpretations contained in policy statements, agency manuals, enforcement letters, and
so forth. None of these comes stamped as bearing, or not bearing, the force of law (and
even if one did, this fact would not be dispositive), and only some of these do in fact
5
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carry “the force of law.” The difference between outputs that carry the force of law and
those that do not turns in part, I want to suggest, on whether an output bears indicia of
true authority or authoritativeness.
To be sure, there is wide agreement in our legal culture that, if an agency is to
generate outputs with the force of law, it is a necessary condition that the agency be
operating under the benefit of delegated power, variously also called authority or
jurisdiction. Like the branches of government that precede them, agencies do not possess
such authority until they receive it as a delegation. Agencies receive their delegation not
from the people directly, as the branches do, but from the people’s earlier delegates, the
constitutionally constituted branches. Furthermore, as we will see, although an agency’s
operating under such authority through formal procedures will frequently raise a
presumption of authoritativeness for the output thus generated, the creation of such an
output through such power and procedure is a necessary but not a sufficient condition for
such an output to carry the force of law. With exceptions that prove the rule,
authoritativeness is also necessary. Though the courts do not say as much in haec verba,
United States v. Mead, a 2001 Supreme Court cased decided 8 to 1, came close. Mead
concerned the basis for deciding how courts should review agency outputs, and, as I hope
to show, the case verges on acknowledging the fullness of law’s dependence upon true
authority, the authoritative. To the extent Mead stops somewhat short, one can register
the pull of that illusion that we can yet be governed by laws to be exclusion of rule by
men and women.

II.

5

The question for the invested maker of widgets is of a piece with the one a court
will ask in the (unlikely) event the regulation comes in for judicial review, and Mead sets
the standard as follows: Is this a brute exercise of power by XYZ? Or is it, instead, the
product not only of the exercise of delegated power but also of deliberation, of minds that
pivot responsibly between the congressionally-enacted statements of law and the realworld concerns for which XYZ is itself charged with making law? Only if it is the latter
will it carry the force of law, because only the latter bears the weight of the authority that
calls forth willing obedience.
This may seem counterintuitive. In the world as we know it or hear about it,
legislation often seems, because it is often said to be, pretty much the whole of law, and
we do not officially hold legislation as a category to anything like the standard I have just
attributed to the courts for review of agency outputs. As Joseph Vining has also
observed, however, “legislation is that statement of law which can come into being
without deliberation, without debate, without reason, and with no need (and perhaps
hope) of justification. To make the point in its strongest form, it could said legislation is
lawless behavior, except that by a paradoxical trick we make legislative statements
materials which we use in determining what the law is.”6 Particular congressionallygenerated legislative texts provide proximate starting points for analysis by agencies and
courts, but they do so within the context of a web of purposive human self-governance.
The bulk of congressional legislation is intended and destined to be given effect,
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sometimes with the force of law, through the workings of agencies, and agencies are not
to be black holes.7

[T]he statute under which an agency operates is not the whole law
applicable to its operation. An agency is not an island entire of itself. It is
one of the many rooms in the magnificent mansion of the law. The very
subordination of the agency to judicial jurisdiction is intended to proclaim
the premise that each agency is to be brought into harmony with the
totality of law; the law as it is found in the statute at hand, the statute book
at large, the principles and conceptions of the “common law,” and the
ultimate guarantees associated with the Constitution.8

If legislation is the arbitrary that we allow, we limit it by giving it effect only upon
evidence that it has then passed through and been shaped and applied by responsible
minds, including in the form of earlier deposits of law. In sum, for an agency output to
carry the force of law, what is needed in the end, with exceptions that prove the rule, is
evidence of responsible – or, better, authoritative -- mind at work.
I was asked to address what the Catholic tradition can bring to the problematic of
“interpretation” in law, and it seems to me that a leading insight the Catholic tradition,
broadly conceived (though I recognize that there will be Catholics who disagree, and
reasonably so, with what I say), can add to the contemporary discourse is that
“interpretation” in law cannot be understood or defended except in the terms with which
7
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we measure the rest of the human practical agenda. Believers in a higher law do not (or
should not) imagine that human law arrives ready-made; it not a “brooding
omnipresence” that descends from on high through a kind of jurisprudential midwifery.
When human law occurs, this is because humans have made it as part of their practical
agenda. Because our putatively legal artifacts are the product of our moral undertaking,
they are liable to moral evaluation and, as a result, to development and correction along
moral lines. These legal artifacts are words, and, as a result, the moral evaluationdevelopment-correction of law will take the form of “interpreting,” and perhaps creating
more, words. (If our memories were sufficiently good, writing might be unnecessary, but
interpretation would still be a necessity). We “interpret” in law in order to determine
how we shall live. There are texts to be paid attention to because they were made in aid
of our efforts to live well.
In other words, what questions should arise under the familiar rubric of
“interpretation” in law is a function of the more basic, and I would say primordial,
question of what it means to live well and to live well together. And that, in turn, in the
view of the Catholic (but not exclusive the Catholic) tradition is a question about how to
make the natural law effective or, perhaps more perspicuously, to fulfill our obligation to
realize our individual and common goods, including through human law and authority.
The life’s work of giving effect to the natural law, including through law, will require
certain acts and qualities of mind, including minds that are willing to create authority and
to obey it.
From what I have just claimed, about its being human law’s task to give effect to
the natural law, it does not follow, however, that the holder of the judicial office is
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necessarily free to do with that office whatsoever he or she reckons is necessary in order
to make the natural law effective hic et nunc. On the contrary, authority or jurisdiction to
make human law awaits assignment or delegation; the natural law does not itself settle
who is charged with making it effective for the common good. To be sure, every rational
person is under the natural law; everyone must do and pursue the good. However, not
every rational person can proceed to make law; the rational person as such does not
possess the jurisdiction to order or command others in order to realize the common good,
no matter how noble his intentions and motives. Authority must be given or delegated in
the form of office, and this is because, I shall argue, the responsibility to ordain things to
the common good rests in the first instance with the entire people. It is only the whole
people or, at the people’s election -- as under the contemporary dispensation -- those
whom they have deputed to work on their behalf, who have the jurisdiction to make and
enforce law.
But, as I began by saying, even such assignment or delegation of authority qua
jurisdiction is not enough. Authority must be delegated in the form of office or
jurisdiction but, further, authority, in the sense of the authoritative, must be earned
through worthy and responsible performance.9 True authority – the authoritative -- is the
hard work of responsible minds. Law’s appearing, I shall argue, depends on the capacity
willingly to obey one or the ones who have authority to order the community toward the
common good, and this will best become clear if we bypass the usual myopic focus on
the judicial office and attend more broadly to the workings of those who have been
assigned the task of making law and of those, like the maker of widgets, who must decide
9
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whether to obey. Again, “[l]aw is evidence of belief far stronger than academic statement
and introspection can provide,”10 and recovery of that evidence depends on attending to
more than loosely moored assertions about what the judge should or should not do what
in the name of “interpretation.” Notes from the underground of administrative law will
deliver instructive “evidence of belief” about how law makes its garden-variety but
obedience-inspiring appearance.

III.
First, however, some favorite false starts should be catalogued and shelved.
Joseph Biden’s tergiversations on the natural law were already signal when he was a
mere Senator, but now that he is Vice-President of the United States, they cry out for
attention. Back in 1990, the Senator first castigated nominee Robert Bork for rejecting
natural law as a basis for judicial action and then, the next season, criticized nominee
Clarence Thomas for embracing the same. The Washington Post caught the
inconsistency, and Senator Biden then explained that there are a good natural law and a
bad natural law, and, presumably, judges should be able to act on the basis of the former,
but not on the basis of the latter.11 What was really going on is not hard to figure out. A
“bad” theory of natural law represents a “code of behavior . . .suggesting that natural law
dictates morality to us, instead of leaving matters to individual choice.”12
U.S. elected officials are not, however, the only source of confusion concerning
what a commitment to natural law entails or invites in terms of the judicial office. When
influential Catholic minds speak to the question of the judicial office, the axes being
10
11
12

VINING, supra note, <> at 5.
See JOHN E. COONS AND PATRICK MCKINLEY BRENNAN, BY NATURE EQUAL 123 (1999).
Sen. Joseph Biden, Law and Natural Law, WASHINGTON POST, Sept. 8, 1991.

10

ground in the not-too-distant background are frequently the flipside of those that
concerned the Senator from Delaware. For example, consider this instruction that Francis
Cardinal George, OMI, the archbishop of Chicago and currently the President of the
United States Conference of Catholic Bishops, and widely regarded as the intellectual
leader among American hierarchy, gave in a scholarly lecture at a law school: “In
working to create a Catholic culture open to the transcendent truths of faith, . . . Catholic
jurists and lawyers, judges and legislators should work to shape a legal system informed
by a sense of right and wrong transcendent to political manipulation.”13 It would be
startling if Cardinal George’s considered judgment were that Catholic (and other?) judges
should be utterly free to disregard human law in order to make the natural law (in his
idiom, the “right”) effective, but the fact is the Cardinal did lump the judge in there
alongside jurists, lawyers, and even legislators, and without so much as a sidelong glance
at the constitutional and statutory grants of power to judges, both state and federal.
Predictably, this perhaps imprecise peroration was preceded by discussion of same-sex
marriage and abortion.
The more common, and arguably more measured, approach among Catholics to
the perceived problem of judicial passivity in the face of immoral laws is to criticize
“legal positivism.” This criticism has become something of a leitmotif in modern papal
teaching. The popes’ repeated objection is that judges are blindly giving effect to
positive law without regard to its conformity with natural law or natural right. Pope
Benedict XVI, for example, then as Cardinal Ratzinger, sounded this warning:
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[J]uridical positivism . . . has taken on the form of the theory of consensus:
if reason is no longer able to find the way to metaphysics as the source of
law, the State can only refer to the common convictions of its citizens’
values, convictions that are reflected in the democratic consensus. Truth
does not create consensus, and consensus does not create truth as much as
it does a common ordering. The majority determines what must be
regarded as true and just. In other words, law is exposed to the whim of
the majority, and depends on the awareness of the values of the society at
any given moment, which in turn is determined by a multiplicity of
factors. This is manifested concretely by the progressive disappearance of
the fundamentals of law inspired by the Christian tradition. . . . Because in
modern States metaphysics, and with it, Natural Law, seem to be
definitely depreciated, there is an ongoing transformation of law, the
ulterior steps of which cannot yet be foreseen; the very concept of law is
losing its precise definition.14

Many similar warnings can be found in the more recent teachings of Pope Benedict, and I
regard them as true and helpful as far as they go. To my knowledge, no modern papal
statement has taken the next step and said simpliciter what I would regard as problematic,
viz., that judges’ jurisdiction is not (justly) limited by human law. And, I hasten to add,
further, that I consider it no indictment of modern papal teaching in this area to say that it
does not purport to resolve the question whether judges on, say, the U.S. Court of Claims
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may sometimes speak the natural law directly, and it strikes me as salutary if such
teaching has the effect of inviting people to heighten their consciousness regarding who
in the particular regimes they know bears the responsibility for making the natural law
effective for the common good.
Though neither had yet converted to the Catholic religion when the exchange
occurred, a more precise analysis comes in Mortimer Adler’s criticism of Robert Bork for
denying that U.S. judges are entitled (let alone obligated) to speak the natural law
directly. By “speak the natural law directly,” I mean the following: to speak in the name
of and with the force of human law and of the governing authoirty what the natural law
requires, even if that requirement does not have a basis in extant human law. Bork
denies, while Adler insists, that our judges should be allowed thus to speak the natural
law directly. But if, as I think, Adler was right that Bork was wrong to claim that our
judges should never speak the natural law directly, Adler was in turn wrong to insist that
judges must always be able to speak the natural law directly. Both Adler and Bork lose
sight of the crucial question, viz., what jurisdiction the people have committed to the
judge.15 Wanting to put the question to bed once and for all, Justice Scalia goes one step
farther when he says, no doubt facetiously, “God applies the natural law.”16
If asked for the truth of the matter, I am confident Justice Scalia would confess
that, on the Catholic view (which he holds to be true), God promulgates the natural law
and it falls to us, not to the Almighty, freely to implement it in our living. The question
we are pursuing now is what exactly the judge’s particular contribution is to be, and, at
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this point, what I wish merely to report that it is the view of most Catholic theorists that
judges and other public officials do not receive from the natural law itself the authority to
enforce the natural law; it is the view of most Catholic theorists that such jurisdiction
must be conferred by another source. John Locke (not a Catholic) was of the view that in
the state of nature every man had a right and duty to enforce the natural law, but the
Catholic tradition, both before and after Locke17, has gravitated toward the requirement
of a positive assignment of ruling authority, either by God or by the people.18
God made David king and gave him regal responsibilities, and today, when not
even the most zealous advocates of American exceptionalism would imagine that God set
down the metes and bounds of the Article III judicial power, the respective judicial
powers of the fifty states (and, presumably, the states that God foreknows will be
admitted to the Union in future), and -- one must not forget -- the adjudicatory powers of
the varied range of administrative agencies, legislative courts, territorial courts, and
courts martial, we are remitted to the people and their respective constituent acts. As
Robert George explains,

If we see that natural law does not dictate an answer to the question of its
own enforcement, it is clear that authority to enforce the natural law may
reasonably be vested primarily, or even virtually exclusively, with the
legislature; or, alternatively, a significant measure of such authority may
be granted to the judiciary as a check on legislative power. The question
whether to vest courts with the power of constitutional judicial review at
17
18
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all, and, if so, what the scope of that power should be, is in important ways
underdetermined by reason. As such, it is a matter to be resolved
prudently by the type of authoritative choice among morally acceptable
options . . . .19

It falls to the people to create offices to assist them in their responsibility to live as the
natural law requires.
The claim so far, then, is that any authority on the part of a public official,
including a “judge,” to act directly upon the basis of the natural law – in, say, interpreting
or even refusing effect to a provision of human law -- depends for its legitimacy upon a
grant by the people. This seems to be the position taken by most of the most serious
contemporary Catholic defenders of the natural law position in jurisprudence, including
Professor George, and it should be welcome by those who are fond, as most today are, of
democracy.

IV.
There has, however, been some weighty pushback of a sort that will make a start
in answering our next question, viz., whether the people should confer on the judge some
authority to speak the natural law directly. Such resistance appears, for example, in
Father Joseph Koterski’s reply to Robert George’s thesis quoted above, and in exploring
this we will see why Catholic theorists tend to deny, as they do, that the natural law
confers jurisdiction for its own communal enforcement. Fr. Koterski grants that the
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natural law “allows for quite diverse forms of government and for different ways of
vesting the various powers that properly belong to civil authority – including our own
practice of the separation of powers into different branches . . . .” He then continues:

If I have understood him correctly, [Professor George] holds that the
natural law does not decide the question of where any power of statutory
review should be located. Thus, Professor George contends that we
should require an express constitutional provision for the judiciary to use
substantive justice known by natural law as the standard for judgment;
otherwise, they should limit themselves to procedural fairness.20

To this interpretation of George (which may exaggerate George’s requirement that the
provision be “express,” but I leave that aside for now), Koterski responds that he finds it
“questionable to hold that there is no natural law warrant for judges especially to employ
insights about substantive questions of justice to overturn legislation that violates natural
law principles.”21 And it is at this point that Koterski offers his alternative theory, which
I quote at length, almost in its entirety:

Authority, it seems to me, in any of its forms, is a matter of witnessing to
truths that are earlier, higher, or logically prior to itself, and using powers
responsibly for that purpose. Civil authority will invariably bring itself
into contempt by excessively activist judicial legislation, but civil
20
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authority can also fail by defect. It can do so, for instance in the scenario
of judges who will not assert themselves to halt injustice that embodied in
legislation, whether by the will of an activist legislature or by a legislature
whipped into action by a media-induced frenzy in the populace. . . .

Put another way, I think that we dare not restrict questions of substantive
justice known by way of the natural law to the realm of politics and
legislation – we dare not do so because of what natural law requires. We
must rather insist that the natural law requires that all three powers of
government (whether these powers are separated as in our system or
combined in some other form of government) need to call to mind and to
act according to substantive justice and not just procedural fairness.
Professor George has argued that there is nothing about the natural law
that gives this role to the judicial branch, so long as some branch of
government has the role. Yet I do not see that the natural law allows any
branch (within a polity whose powers are separated into distinct branches)
to be excused from this function.22

To which I would respond, yes and no -- and this on the basis of what this “natural law,”
of which we have been speaking, is and requires.23

22

Id. at 2298-99.
Here I advance an understanding of the natural law that is different from the one Professor George
defends, but I do not believe that the difference matters to the present question about the who has public
authority to make the natural law effective for the common good.

23
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In his book The Great Rehearsal: The Story of the Making and Ratifying of the
Constitution of the United States, Carl Van Doren tells the story of the disturbed New
Englander who objected to the two-year senatorial term proposed by the Constitutional
Convention on the ground that a one-year term was “a dictate of the law of nature; spring
comes once a year, and so should a batch of new senators.”24 We laugh, but at what?
This is the heart of the matter, and unclogging it means banishing the accumulated
rationalist images according to which the natural law is some sort of “ghostly Internal
Revenue Code in all its magnificent detail written in the heavens.”25 Answering the
question what role the judge should have vis-à-vis the natural law depends in part on
what the natural law is, and, on the view I am proposing, the question turns out to be
what role the judge should have in implementing human goods.
On the traditional Catholic understanding, the divine natural law is an ordinance
of reason instilled in the human intellect by God as part of his providential ruling of the
universe, and the first precept of that law (which is divine in its origin but held naturally
in our human minds) is that “the good is to be done and pursued and evil avoided.” This
is that natural law – that goods are to be done, non-goods are not to be done; all else that
can be said in the name of the natural law is just so many intermediate and, ultimately,
particular judgments of what is good and, therefore, to be done. What is good for
humans is the achievement of their end, that is, their happiness, and there are countless
steps along the way – the daily tasks of friendship, the deeds of healthy eating, the labors
of learning, the delights and duties of reproduction and rearing, and so forth. Discerning
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among and realizing these exigencies (e.g., nourishment) and possibilities (e.g.,
reproduction) are the work of a lifetime.26
To succeed in the daily task of pursuing and doing what concretely will realize the
component parts of human happiness requires, further, the creation and maintenance of a
social order, one requirement of which is human law. One can even say that the social
order and a viable system of human law are a requirement of the natural law. Without
them, other individual and common goods cannot be achieved, except per accidens. I say
“other” because the social order and positive law are themselves goods -- if, but only if,
they contribute to humans’ achieving their other basic goods such as nourishment,
shelter, the conditions of sociability, family life, and so forth.
The previous two paragraphs amount to just the thinnest of skeletal outlines of a
natural law theory, but it is enough to begin to indicate why to speak (as Father Koterski
does repeatedly) of “what the natural law requires” cannot but, at this level, invite
misunderstanding.27 The unbending requirement that the good be done and pursued and
non-good avoided does not entail that the people we refer to as “judges” must have the
jurisdiction to speak the natural law directly.

Under perfectly conceivable

circumstances, a system of human law can be a good exactly by not allowing judges to
speak the natural law directly. Koterski denies “that the natural law allows any branch
(within a polity whose powers are separated into distinct branches) to be excused from
this function” of (as I would say) speaking the natural law directly, but this denial gets
things backwards. “[T]he natural law” tells us that the good is to be done and pursued; it
26
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does not – because it cannot – tell us that it is necessarily a good to give judges the power
to speak the natural law directly.
Please permit me to belabor this point that is so often misunderstood. Implicit in
any claim regarding what the natural law “requires” must be a promissory note to
demonstrate on demand, to a reasonable standard of proof, that doing or instantiating the
good requires this particular arrangement. The natural law is not anything more (or less)
that the (divine) command that the good alone is to be done and pursued and its opposite
avoided. The precept that “the good be done and pursued” does not, so to speak, make
the mistake of assuming that all government actors should be positioned to act coercively
on its behalf; frequently enough, more than one arrangement can get the job done. The
question of whether it would be good for judges here and now, or here in the foreseeable
future, to speak the natural law directly is a question of relatively particular fact that is to
be resolved based on a prudential judgment of the relevant data. Yes, everyone must be
engaged in the business of making the natural law effective, but this project may favor –
or even require – that some people be entrusted with, and others not be entrusted with, the
jurisdiction to speak the natural law directly for the sake of the common good.
To put the point I have been developing another way, human law is not only a
need of the natural law; we can also say that it is derived from the natural law. Following
St. Thomas Aquinas, one can distinguish two ways by which human law is derived from
the natural law.28 The first is by way of conclusions from premises; for example, the
conclusion that one should not kill an innocent follows directly from the precept that
goods – including this innocent person’s – are to be pursued. The second way is by what
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Aquinas calls determinatio, which means something like specification; in this way,
something left underdetermined by the natural law itself is given specific form. To take a
familiar example, traffic laws will be necessary when transportation becomes abundant
and concentrated, but from the necessity for traffic laws nothing follows about on which
side of the road people should drive. Likewise and more generally, a system of human
law is necessary, and providing such a system requires personnel to create and enforce it,
but this project does not necessarily require that those who pass judgment under human
law have the authority to speak the natural law directly. Aquinas underlines that “those
things that are derived in the second way, have no other force than that of human law.”29
For the foregoing reasons, then, I deny that the natural law necessarily requires
that everyone in authority in a system of separated powers be given the jurisdiction to
speak the natural law directly. The natural law does not ex proprio vigore assign
jurisdiction to judges, because the natural law as such is powerless to say, so to speak,
whether their speaking the natural law directly is a good. But there remains the further
question whether in general or in particular cases it will be prudent for the people (or
their representatives) to assign judges such power.

V.
In the process of making the claim that I have been arguing against, Fr. Koterski
introduces an essential, enriching theme concerning the nature of authority. Specifically,
he insists that true authority “witness[es] to truths that are earlier, higher, or logically
prior to itself.”30 Apart from certain introductory statements, the discussion so far has
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deliberately treated “authority” as merely the power or jurisdiction perfunctorily to say
what the law is. But given human law’s essential relationship to the good, it should be
plain enough that “to say what the law is” – law’s appearing – is not simply a lapidary
function of (delegated) power. There is nothing perfunctory about it, for it depends, with
exceptions that prove the rule, upon the appearance of what is authoritative. The
authoritative? In this age of Hooper, game theory, Max Weber, bureaucracy, Jerry
Mashaw’s law of conservation of administrative discretion31, and textualism rampant (I
do not say regnant), an insistence upon the authoritative may seem quixotic, wishful,
revisionist, or benighted. What I wish to suggest, however, is that the courts and the
agencies first, and then some among the commentators second, have refused to sell true
authority – the authoritative – short, at least in the main. There is no surprise that
mischief sometimes slips in, even at the highest levels, but the quest to keep it out is what
is truly impressive.
The fight is fought on many fields, but in an especially revealing way in the
relationship between courts and agencies. Lodged within an intractable debate about how
to conceptualize, compartmentalize, or categorize the possible or required postures of
courts vis-a-vis agency outputs (e.g., on “questions of law,” “questions of fact,” or
“mixed questions”), the insistence upon the authoritative is as palpable as it is anywhere
on the field of law. On the surface, all judicial review of agency action is governed by
statutes and their uncontroversial judicial glosses. Absent overriding language in an
agency’s organic statute, the statute that presumptively governs is section 706 of the
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Administrative Procedure Act (1946).32 Anyone possessed of even a glancing familiarity
with modern American administrative law, however, knows that that statute has only a
nominal and superficial influence on the actual practice of judicial review, more in some
connections than others. Even in the face of statutes that claim in terms to decide what
review is adequate, the courts uncontroversially answer the question for themselves.33
Overarchingly,

the scope of judicial review is ultimately conditioned and determined by
the major proposition that the constitutional courts of this country are the
major architects and guarantors of the integrity of the judicial system. I
use integrity here in its specific sense of unity and coherence and in its
more general sense of the effectuation of the values upon which the unity
and coherence are built.34

The availability of adequate judicial review is axiomatic for the legitimacy of the
administrative state, and the courts are the determiners of adequacy. But what is
“adequate?”
One unsung possibility would be for a reviewing court to substitute its judgment
for an agency’s if it should appear to the court to be prudent to do so. The inefficiencies
of such an approach are obvious, but there other reasons no one defends it. The principal
32

“To the extent necessary to decision and when presented, the reviewing court shall decide all relevant
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reason is that although, according to the U.S. Constitution, “All legislative Powers herein
granted shall be vested in a Congress of the United States,”35 and although the official
view remains that “‘[the] power of the legislative, being derived from the people by a
positive voluntary grant conveyed, which being only to make laws, and not to make
legislators, the legislative can have no power to transfer their authority of making laws
and place it in other hands,’”36 it is not seriously contested today that our Congress
creates agencies and delegates to them the power or authority sometimes to make lawlike-things.37 An overt conflict with the terms of the Constitution is avoided, without
slipping into the silliness of a jurisprudence of “law-like-things,” by acknowledging, as
the Court did in Mead, that agencies sometimes generate outputs that carry “the force of
law.” Such “outputs” (as I have referred to them) would not carry the force of law if
courts were free to disregard them at will; conversely, if they do not carry the force of
law, on what basis would courts not be free to disregard them? But what is it for an
output to carry the force of law such that a court should defer to it and others should obey
it?
Reserving the possibility of invalidation upon judicial review (with all that that
means about where law really is), we can say that Congress makes “laws” by following
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the procedures set out in the Constitution, viz., bicameralism and presentment. There is,
however, no such bright-line rule for determining when agency outputs bear the force of
law. Even when an agency has received and used a delegation to make outputs, not every
procedurally-proper agency output will in fact carry the force of law. This is the
dispositive question, and in 2001, in the Mead case, the Court restated it and refined the
answer. Justice Souter’s complex opinion for eight members of the Court admits of
multiple readings, but there is no question but that, as Justice Scalia’s dissent observed,
the Court was intentionally trying to put judicial review of administrative outputs on a
new footing. In Justice Scalia’s own words: “Today’s opinion makes an avulsive change
in judicial review of federal administrative action.”38
The proximate background to Mead was the Court’s much-discussed decision in
Chevron v. U.S.A. v. Natural Resources Council, Inc, in 1984. The Chevron Court
started from the uncontroversial premise that, when “Congress has spoken to the precise
question at issue,” that is, when “the intent of Congress is clear,” then “that is the end of
the matter.” From there, the Court went on to reason that, on the one hand, “[i]f
Congress has explicitly left a gap for the agency to fill, there is an express delegation of
authority to the agency to elucidate a specific provision of the statute by regulation,” but,
on the other hand, “[s]ometimes the legislative delegation to an agency on a particular
question is implicit rather than explicit.” In either case, that of explicit or implicit
delegation, Chevron required courts to defer to agencies’ “permissible construction of the
statute.” Chevron thus spoke clearly in terms of delegation, both explicit and implicit.
Thomas Merrill and Kristin Hickman summarized the achievement of Chevron as
follows:
38
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Chevron expanded the sphere of mandatory deference through one simple
shift in doctrine: It posited that courts have a duty to defer to reasonable
agency interpretations not only when Congress expressly delegated
interpretative authority to an agency, but also when Congress is silent or
leaves an ambiguity in a statute an agency is charged with administering.
The Court in Chevron blandly referred to such gaps and ambiguities as
“implied” delegations of interpretative authority and treated these implied
delegations as equivalent to express delegations.39

Justice Scalia, also blandly, summarized the doctrinal situation in his dissent in Mead:
“When, said Chevron, Congress leaves an ambiguity in a statute that is to be administered
by an administrative agency, it is presumed that Congress meant to give the agency
discretion, within the limits of reasonable interpretation, as to how the ambiguity is to be
resolved.”
It was the achievement of Mead, as Justice Scalia observed by way of criticism, to
return the focus from the question of whether to statute is ambiguous to the question of
whether (and if so, what) power Congress has delegated: “What previously was a general
presumption of authority in agencies to resolve ambiguity in the statutes they have been
authorized to enforce has been changed to a presumption of no such authority, which
must be overcome by affirmative legislative intent to the contrary.”40 The Mead Court
was insistent that the issue was whether Congress intentionally delegated authority to
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speak with the force of law when making policy judgments based on the statute(s) it is
charged with administering. In addition to cases of explicit delegation thus to speak with
the force of law, the Court explained,

it can still be apparent from the agency’s generally conferred authority and
other statutory circumstances that Congress would expect the agency to be
able to speak with the force of law when it addresses ambiguity in the
statute or fills a space in the enacted law, even one about which “Congress
did not actually have an intent as to the particular result.”41

The focal issue, then, is delegation of authority, not the presence of ambiguity. But the
focal issue is not the only one, for Fr. Koterski’s point returns when the Court takes up
the question of what will count as sufficient evidence of such implicit delegation.
In the period leading up to Mead, there had been considerable debate in the
literature about the justification for Chevron deference. The best theory, in part because
it found the most support in the Court’s own opinions, was that Chevron was justified on
the basis of an assumed congressional intent. According to this theory, “[d]eference is
mandatory because Congress has commanded it. The command is only implicit –
presumed rather than explicit – but it is a command all the same.”42 The stage for putting
Chevron on a new foundation began to be set, as one sees in retrospect, in 2000. First, in
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FDA v. Brown & Williamson, Justice O’Connor, in a five-to-four decision (from which
Justice Breyer wrote the dissent), noted that sometimes there may be reason to conclude
that a statutory ambiguity is not intended by Congress as an implicit delegation.43
Second, in a another case decided in 2000, Justice Breyer in dissent identified
“circumstances in which Chevron-type deference is inapplicable,” viz., those “where one
has doubt that Congress actually intended to delegate interpretive authority to the agency
(an ‘ambiguity’ that Chevron does not presumptively leave to agency resolution).”44 The
assumption of implicit delegation through ambiguity was on the rocks.
A year later, by which time Justice Breyer was in a newly-formed, eight-member
majority, the Court was no longer willing to treat ambiguity as raising a presumption of
implicit delegation. The Mead Court takes its stand upon an across-the-board insistence
of evidence of affirmative delegation. Noting that “we have recognized a good indicator
of delegation meriting Chevron treatment in express congressional authorizations to
engage in the process or rulemaking or adjudication that produces regulations or rulings
for which deference is claimed,” the Court proceeded to explain “[i]t is fair to assume
generally that Congress contemplates administrative action with the effect of law when it
provides for a relatively formal administrative procedure tending to foster the fairness
and deliberation that should underlie a pronouncement of such force” (emphasis added).
The provision or use of relative formality of administrative procedure is not, however, a
necessary condition for making an output bearing the force of law. “We have sometimes
found reasons for . . . deference even when no such administrative formality was required
and none was afforded.” In the Supreme Court case that the Mead Court cites for this
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proposition, NationsBank of N.C. v. Variable Annuity Life Ins. Co., the relevant agency
official, the Comptroller General, whose ruling the Court agreed should received
deference, had reached “‘deliberative conclusions.’”45
The first achievement of Mead, then, is to require evidence of an affirmative
delegation of power to make outputs carrying the force of law.46 The second
achievement, though less obvious, was to raise up “fairness and deliberation” as
normative for whether an output has the force of law. The Court treats the provision of
formality as signaling a delegation of power to make outputs carrying the force of law;
however, by not requiring the provision of formality before finding the delegation of
authority to make such outputs, the Court quietly made the “fairness and deliberation that
should underlie a pronouncement of law” its touchstone. Refusing to elide formality with
law-making power, the Court struck a quiet blow at formalism.
If this development was subtle, it was clear enough to vex those who would like a
closer identification between formal procedures and the capacity to make outputs
carrying the force of law. For example, Thomas Merrill has commented wryly that “[f]or
whatever reason, the [Mead] Court acknowledged that whether Congress has prescribed
formal procedures is neither a necessary nor sufficient condition of finding the relevant
45
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delegation; it is at most a factor positively correlated with the likelihood that such a
delegation has occurred.”47 The “reason” that Merrill does not mention is not far to find.
The passage from Mead on which Merrill is commenting is not just about whether a
delegation has been made; it is, in terms, about whether deference is in fact due to
particular administrative outputs: “the overwhelming number of our cases applying
Chevron deference have reviewed the fruits of notice-and-comment rulemaking or formal
adjudication [but], . . . . the want of that procedure here does not decide the case, for we
have sometimes found reasons for Chevron deference where no administrative formality
was required and none was afforded.”48 The “reason,” then, that formality is not
sufficient is that it is not even necessary: what is necessary (though not sufficient) is
deliberation and fairness, what “should underlie a pronouncement of law.” What one
commentator says derisively of Mead, I commend: “agency procedure is crucial for
strong deference analysis except where it is not.”49

VI.
Better to understand the way in which the Court clarified the centrality of
deliberation and fairness, another important achievement of Mead needs to be introduced
into the discussion. In the wake of Chevron and until Christensen, it had appeared that
deference was now to be an all-or-nothing phenomenon. Although deference based
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solely on outputs’ power to persuade (proportional deference, as opposed to Chevron’s
strong or complete deference), a doctrine associated above all with Justice Jackson’s
majority opinion in Skidmore v. Swift & Co., as Chevron occupied the territory deference
came to be seen as a scalar quantity. Skidmore was never overruled, though, and in
Christensen, the Court explicitly revived the possibility of Skidmore deference,
prompting a dissent from Justice Scalia in which he argued that “Skidmore deference to
authoritative agency views is an anachronism, dating from an era in which we declined to
give agency interpretations authoritative effect.” In Mead the Court because systematic
about the question it had resolved in favor of Skidmore in Christensen: it framed and
faced “a choice about the best way to deal with an inescapable feature of the body of
congressional legislation authorizing administrative action.” Having held that Skidmore
deference was alive and well as a possible congressionally-mandated judicial response to
agency outputs, the Mead Court continued: “Justice Scalia’s first priority over the years
has been to limit and simplify. The Court’s choice has been to tailor deference to variety.
This acceptance of the range of statutory variation has led the Court to recognize more
than one variety of judicial deference, just as the Court has recognized a variety of
indicators that Congress would expect Chevron deference.”
Without making the Mead opinion clearer or more emphatic than it is, what I
would suggest is that the Court’s willingness to find evidence of explicit delegation of
authority to make outputs carrying the force of law even where no formal procedures
have been provided or used offers a clue about what the Court is really after. The Court’s
resistance to the sufficiency of the provision and subsequent use of formality – the pro
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tanto rejection of formalism – has deep jurisprudential springs.50 On the one hand, a
congressional intent to delegate is required, and for this formality can often serve as a
proxy. On the other, and this is the Koterski point, there is an insistence that deference be
conditioned upon not just exercises in delegated power, but also, and across the board,
upon the fairness and deliberation “that should underlie a pronouncement of law.” Here
we have a normative theory of lawmaking. To produce something carrying the force of
law, something calling for strong deference or obedience, is to exercise delegated power
with fairness and deliberation, not merely to go through the form of prescribed
procedures.51
To highlight the significance of this, consider Justice Scalia’s opposing view. In
addition to rejecting the possibility of Skidmore deference, Justice Scalia also rejects the
Court’s insistence that the agency have done more than merely resolve a statutory
ambiguity in a way that is minimally reasonable or permissible. Whereas, as we have
seen, the Court insists upon evidence of fairness and deliberation (sometimes in the form
of the proxy of formal procedures), Justice Scalia is satisfied if the agency output is
“authoritative,” and by that he means that it “is truly the agency’s considered view,” not
just “the opinions of some underlings.” For Justice Scalia, it is enough that the output
represent “the official position of the agency,” “the judgment of central agency
50
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management.” By all of this Justice Scalia does not mean the product of apparent
“fairness and deliberation.” Rather than concentrate on what went into creating the
output, Justice Scalia is “satisfied”52 if, when said output has been attacked in court, the
agency has decided to defend it there. As the Court has pointed out, however, this means
that what is receiving deference is not the output and the quality of its making but,
strangely, the brief in court.53
Admittedly, Justice Scalia is nominally on the side of authority and even of the
“authoritative.” On his preferred position, a reasonable agency interpretation and
application of an ambiguous statutory provision must be “sustained so long as it
represent[s] the agency’s authoritative interpretation.” And the “‘authoritativeness’” of
an agency interpretation,” Justice Scalia continues,

does not turn on upon whether it has been enunciated by someone who is
actually employed by the agency. It must represent the judgment of
central agency management, approved at the highest levels. . . . [I]t is a
line that focuses on the right question: . . . whether it is truly the agency’s
considered view, or just the opinions of some underlings, that are at
issue.54

For Justice Scalia, “authoritativeness” is the talisman, and it is present when the agency
output “represents the official position of the agency.”55 But again, the agency can make
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something its “official position,” thereby rendering its output authoritative, by defending
the same when attacked court. What was not authoritative in its origins and production
can become authoritative by being defended in litigation.56 For Justice Scalia,
authoritative means official.
In sum, both sides acknowledge, at least nominally, the need for authority -- an
accomplishment that neither side imagines to be a scalar quantity. Furthermore, the
Court, but not Justice Scalia, has made the authoritativeness inquiry turn on
deliberateness and fairness, for which formal procedures can sometimes serve as a proxy.
Moreover, the Court has been willing to pay a reasonably high price to fine-tune the
analysis as it has. Not only by looking for indicia of deliberateness, which will tend to be
more demanding than looking to see whether the agency has, say, made a notice-andcomment rule or signed a litigation brief, but also in insisting, again pace Justice Scalia,
that sometimes when Chevron deference is not called for, because the above criteria have
not been met, Skidmore’s intermediate level of deference will be called for. Epistemic
deference of the Skidmore sort makes good sense; even though the agency did not set out
to make law, its decision will be given effect to the extent of its power to persuade. It is
hard to argue with the persuasive.
What Mead adds is that “even” when the agency sets out to make law and does so
in a formally authorized way, whether its output will be given the force of law depends
upon something further. To be sure, in the overwhelming number of cases, formality will
serve as sufficient proxy for deliberation and fairness, but this must not obscure the fact
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that deliberation and fairness are the aim, if not always directly the test, and they can be
found where formality is altogether missing.
Mead has been criticized for being “perfectionist.”57 The Court’s opinion, though,
was itself clear about at least some of the necessary imperfections it countenanced. The
Mead Court was not under any illusions about whether courts can always ascertain
Congress’s intent, even on the decisive question of whether there has been a delegation of
power to make outputs bearing the force of law. Living in the face of the nondelegation
doctrine, Congress has reasons not to trumpet its intentional delegations of power to
make outputs bearing the force of law! The Court forthrightly acknowledged that its own
position would sometimes deliver only a second-best, but at least not a third- or fourthbest:

We think, in sum, that Justice Scalia’s efforts to simplify ultimately run
afoul of Congress’s indications that different statutes present different
reasons for considering respect for the exercise of administrative authority
or deference to it. Without being at odds with congressional intent much
of the time, we believe that judicial responses to administrative action
must continue to differentiate between Chevron and Skidmore . . . .58
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Evan Criddle has argued that, by “hightlight[ing],” and expecting lower courts to
highlight, “the concerns that a reasonable legislator might consider when deciding
whether to delegate interpretive authority to an agency,” in order to determine whether a
delegation has in fact been made, the Mead Court rendered the requirement of a
delegation a “fiction.”59 On the contrary, however, this is simply a piece of realism
about, and an inference from, how and on what basis delegations of power to make
outputs bearing the force of law usually get made. When the delegation inquiry becomes
empirically intractable, Mead acknowledges that evidence of the conditions of
deliberation will sometimes be enough.
This focus on the concerns of a reasonable legislator, furthermore, acknowledges
that the delegation inquiry was always about something else as well – not merely the
intentional transfer of power, but also the creation of the conditions for generating the
authoritative. Though Criddle is, I submit, wrong to treat the delegation inquiry as a
fiction, he is right that it also works “as a heuristic for highlighting the concerns that a
reasonable legislator might consider when deciding whether to delegate interpretive
authority to an administrative agency.”60 Sometimes Congress will “deem it necessary or
desirable to shift policy formulation to cheaper, more flexible, and more informal
processes,”61 and Mead directs courts to look for evidence of delegation, but not
necessarily of formality, as a necessary but not a sufficient condition of giving strong

59

Evan Criddle, Chevron’s Consensus, 88 B.U. L. REV. 1271, 1304 (2008); see also David J.Barron &
Elena Kagan, Chevron’s Nondelegation Doctrine, 2001 SUP. CT. REV. 201, 203-05 (2001).
60
Criddle, supra note <> at 1304.
61
John Manning, Nonlegislative Rules, 72 Geo. Wash. L.Rev. 893, 944 (2004). Mead recognizes “that
idiosyncratic statutory circumstances may, at times, suggest a legislative preference for deferential review
of less formal agency action.” Id. at 940.

36

(Chevron) deference to agency outputs. What is additionally needful is that evidence of
deliberateness and fairness.
The clarification of this additional requirement, which I have described as the
second achievement of Mead, has long been lodged elsewhere in administrative law, in
the requirement known as “hard look” review.62 Some commentators and judges have
taken the view, and not without reason, that hard look review is a different species of
review than the one required by Chevron and Mead. However, to the extent that Mead is
understood as demanding evidence of careful, deliberate reasoning, the difference
disappears. As one commentator explained several years before Mead was decided:

The essence of hard look review is careful examination of an agency’s
reasoning process, and the conclusions that the agency has drawn in
reasoning from the underlying statute are certainly an important element
of that examination.63

While some commentators may still prefer to keep sharp the distinction between
statutory/outcome review (what they regard as the Chevron question) and process review
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(what they regard as the “hard look” question)64, it is at least arguable that Mead
subsumes these questions within its assertion of what “should” go into a statement
carrying the force of law: deliberateness and fairness, the necessary conditions of what I
have called the authoritative.

VII.
In the intricacies and imperfections of administrative law, far from the headlines
of constitutional law and interpretation, an important story is being told about what is
necessary if law is to appear. The doctrine I have been trying to tease out of the opinion
in Mead confirms the judicial practice – that “evidence of belief far stronger than
academic statement and introspection can provide -- that Joseph Vining described in the
following terms, a decade before Mead was decided:

Before deferring, courts certainly look for expertise – which may itself be
an evidently genuine and independent concern with the subject matter – or
a mission legislatively given to the agency to achieve the values promoted
by the rule in question. But whatever courts find after looking for these,
they regularly demand, and condition their deference upon, evidence that
the agency has in fact responsibly considered the question fully and on the
merits. . . . Courts’ demands for such evidence and division of such
evidence into its various usually encountered kinds make up the doctrines
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and subdoctrines of the jurisprudence of deference, which are then linked
into doctrines designed to allow time and opportunity for responsible
decisions that can be so evidenced.

Without these evidences of a responsible mind at work, a court is
markedly less interested in the formality that the agency’s name is
attached to what is said to affected parties and the court. . . . The agency
is like any other adversary in the world: to the extent it is not responsible,
its statements do not have what is called “the force of law.” 65

It is not enough that the agency’s name is attached; not enough that the agency used
(comparatively) formal procedures; not enough that people were given an opportunity to
participate66 ; not enough that agency officials went through the motions that lie within
their delegated authority or jurisdiction; not enough that the agency is willing to sign the
brief and defend the position in court. For an agency’s output to be recognized as
carrying “the force of law,” the court must be satisfied that there is sufficient evidence of
the “creation of authority in the daily fabric of public life,”67 a union of delegated power
and its careful use. As noted, Mead has been criticized for being perfectionist, and no
doubt the costs created by its insistence upon evidence of delegation and of
deliberateness must be assessed; the costs of the alternative, however, the costs of
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systematically ignoring the presence or absence of responsible mind, are too great to
calculate.68
That said, one should not hurry past the larger worry that lurks in the background,
the concern that all of this is a mere cover for politics and interest trading. Vining
exposes the cause for anxiety this way:

Legal analysis consists of working with texts, as others work with texts.
There is much else in addition in the practice of law and much else in the
deciding of a wrenching case. But this is what the legally trained do when
asked to find the law and say what the law is, whether they are judges, or
among those who are, in fact, the source of statements of law in that
greater part of human affairs that does not and never can reach a court.

Are they foolish to engage in this kind of activity? Is it a front, a cover?
Is it beside the point, superfluous or superstructural? The question is
always with us and may be asked now . . . .

69

The quoted language is from Joseph Vining’s The Authoritative and the Authoritarian,
and I shall postpone reporting Vining’s own answer to “[t]he question . . . [that] may be
asked now.” The question for us is whether it is foolish to read texts carefully. The rule
of Mead is about how courts should treat agencies’ interpretations and applications of the
statutes they are charged with administering. It presses for evidence that the agency’s
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actors have read carefully and considered, with deliberation and fairness, the possible
consequences of different readings and applications of the texts of their organic statutes.
It presses, in other words, for true authority as a condition of requiring the willing
obedience we associate with law.
Is all of this a cover or superfluous? Is the court’s engaging in this enquiry before
saying whether or not an output shall have the force of law silly? I would say no. Why?
Because it tracks, anticipates, and encourages the empirical conditions of the possibility
of giving effect to the natural law. Apart from the possibility of the accidental occurrence
of goods, only responsible minds can identify the terms on which the good can enter.
Agency actors do this in partnership with Congress, looking to Congress’s intents and
purposes given in legal texts, and by sizing up and then adjusting their consequences for
those who will be affected. Agencies have jurisdiction, the power to make outputs that
potentially carry the force of law, and Mead does what it can to require that those outputs
carry authority – to require, that is, that they (as Koterski indicated) “witness to higher
truths” or, in less lofty prose, to the speak the truth about what is worth doing. This they
can they do only by being the products of responsible minds.
In sum, law’s appearing depends upon the operations and the reciprocal
discernings of a chain of responsible minds. Whether XYZ does what it does arbitrarily
or lawfully – and that is the dilemma -- can only be settled by a mind that is capable of
saying where there is law, and it would be a mistake to imagine that this is like doing
arithmetic or following a recipe. Saying where there is law will require belief and,
correlatively, something worthy of being believed, which just is the authoritative.
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What I mean by belief has been developed at length by Vining70 and elsewhere by
Steven Smith.71 Here it will be enough to mention James Boyd White’s equally
illuminating and complementary account of belief in law. White notes that belief of the
sort law depends upon is not belief in the way we usually understand the word, “namely
an assertion of propositions claiming to utter the truth of what cannot be known.” Rather,
it refers to “a form of love: it is cognate with the archaic ‘lief,’ as in ‘I would lief,’ and
with our word ‘love’ itself.”72 As White goes on to explain, law worthy of obedience,
rather than of craven compliance, depends for its creation upon a love of persons, of
justice for them, and, as I would say, of goods for them. Without such belief – without
such love – law cannot but stifle and oppress, because it cannot, except accidentally,
realize goods. The statistician can tell us when force will be used, but only the person
capable of belief, of the sort I have just indicated, is able to say where the law is, because
only such a person is capable of detecting and discerning what is truly good. Note well I
do not suggest that the callous mind that does not believe -- does not grant the authority
of a good law -- is not the beneficiary of law. Those who do not believe in the law do
sometimes experience law’s consequences and enjoy law’s benefits. There are among us
freeriders on the believers and the believable, and they among those who imagine that we
can approach a state of being ruled by laws to the exclusion of rule by men and women.

VIII.
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In conclusion, I would not wish to be misunderstood as imagining there exists “a
Catholic view” on administrative law or, more broadly, on constitutionalism or the like.
The Catholic tradition, though, does consistently testify to a number of truths about the
human person and the society he creates that have more or less inescapable implications
for statecraft and governance. What I have underlined in Sections V, VI, and VII is that
the simplifying moves by which courts might conclude that Congress can delegate
lawmaking powers and then let agencies do whatever lies formally within the scope of
that delegation, have been in our American jurisprudence subordinated to a higher
requirement. That requirement is of the sort Catholics, I think, must insist upon. It is not
that agencies must be giving effect to that “ghostly Internal Revenue Code,” but rather
that agencies must be giving effect to the requirement that we pursue goods. In families,
it is usually sufficient for a parent to say “It is good for you to eat your spinach; you will
eat it” or “It is bad for you to play with poison; you will not play with it.” The more
highly developed and differentiated the society, though, the greater the distance between
the basic goods, such as nourishment and safety, and the systemic requirements for
avoiding contamination, such as ensuring regular production and timely delivery, and so
forth. In the contemporary situation, agencies have a vast role in creating the goods that
ensure that the basic goods get delivered, and it would not work, for long, for agencies
not to be deliberate. Courts’ encouraging them to be deliberate is a good, and courts’
refusing effect to what is not the product of deliberation is a related good. Courts
encourage agencies to believe, so that they can in turn be believed – and obeyed. Even if
Congress did not intend courts to review, and therefore did not delegate to courts the
jurisdiction to review, formal administrative outputs for indicia of authority, and even if
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Congress did not delegate to courts the power to recognize non-formal agency outputs as
having the force of law – still, the linking of deference to true authority found in
responsible mind has its own warrant. “Legislation is the arbitrary that we allow – but
also limit.” To be sure, there must be a division of labor, and for the reasons I argued in
Parts III and IV, those divisions must be respected; anything else would be ultra vires.
The ultra vires vel non analysis, however, proceeds against the background
requirement of everyone’s and the system’s being under the natural law. As (at least) an
aggregate of individuals under the natural law, the people should parcel out power in a
way that optimizes the possibility that legal decision-makers will be in position to be just
flexible enough to see that the natural law is given effect, and the particulars will depend
upon time and place. But in any workable legal system we should not be surprised to
hear courts say the following:

The courts have rarely, if ever, felt themselves so restrained by technical
rules that they could not find some remedy, consistent with the law, for
acts, whether done by government or by individual persons, that violated
natural justice . . . .73

Likewise, we should not be surprised to hear courts requiring agencies to be deliberate,
and courts, and those watching them, should not lightly presume that courts do not have
the jurisdiction to demand that agencies be deliberate and truly authoritative in their
lawmaking work. Though we should admit that we often fall short, we should not
hesitate also to acknowledge the ways in which the legal system we inherit holds out for
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what is worthy of obedience. What I have been describing “might be characterized as
implementation of the rule of law. But no longer is it best described in that way.” Vining
continues:

The connotations of both ‘rule’ and ‘law’ in the phrase ‘rule of law,’ of
objective legal substance, objective legal persons, and hierarchical
obedience, are descended from societies less aware of their dynamism
than ours. Speaking of this rather as attention to the force of law, and to
what is necessary if society is to have the force of law within it, will be
truer to the language and more natural to the wider consciousness of those
who are thus engaged in the creation of authority in the daily fabric of
public life.74

Law’s appearing depends upon the achievement of the authoritative. It would be the
perverse and reliably self-defeating legal system that attempted to confine the project of
implementing human goods to the interpreting of legal texts solely in light of the texts
themselves (whatever that might mean). Somehow, somehow, whatever the power
delegated to legislature for giving effect to the natural law, the variousness of human
living would seem ordinarily, if not always, to require others in the lawmaking, and
applying, and enforcing work to have, as a matter of established human law, at least some
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access to speak the natural law directly.75 Mead applies, by its own terms, “even . . .
[when] ‘Congress did not actually have an intent as to the particular result.’” The good
always is particular, and texts can never anticipate every particularity. “When American
government officials bind themselves ‘to support’ the Constitution, they are not swearing
blind obedience to some form or process of arbitrary decision. They are, as [Chief
Justice] Marshall explained, making a promise to engage their ‘abilities and
understanding’ in a serious effort to make sense of an instrument that is susceptible to
their efforts.”76
Looking back, we can ask again the question put by Vining, and now benefit the
more from Vining’s answer:

Are they foolish to engage in this kind of activity? Is it a front, a cover?
Is it beside the point, superfluous or superstructural? The question is
always with us and may be asked now . . . .

The shape of the answer that will emerge should be evident. It is an
answer of the not-if kind. Not foolish, not superfluous, if law is to have
authority. Not if law is to hold us, evoke our willing acceptance rather
than our resistance. Not if law is to be a source to be looked to in
discovering what we ought to do. Perhaps we do not or ought not to want
that; but if we do not, then we cannot complain about disintegration,
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disappearance of authority, of respect, and of self-respect, or loss of
meaning in the modern state.77

And if we do not, nor can we complain, in the idiom I have preferred in this essay, about
the failure of the natural law to be given effect in our living, the disappearance of goods
from our fragile lives in which the good, if it is to be alive, must be always under
construction.
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